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	ABSTRACT 
The rise in weather shocks in Kenya has compromised farmers’ ability to smooth consumption, 
rendering farmers more vulnerable. In light of this development, it is essential to analyze the 
relationship between that vulnerability and the usage of different financial services, and the reverse 
role of vulnerability on the take up of these services. I run a simultaneous three-stage-least square 
model to control for the endogeneity and identify the interplay between usage of credit, savings, 
and vulnerability. I find that no variable significantly influences the usage of any form of credit, 
which has a significant and positive impact on savings and vulnerability through loans from 
informal sources. I also find strong evidence of a substitution effect between taking loans from 
formal sources and taking loans from informal sources, since the two are asymmetrically correlated 
with vulnerability. External credit rationing is the most likely culprit. Additionally, I demonstrate 
that financial penetration does not guarantee the usage of services such as credit, and is therefore 
insufficient in tackling vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Despite attempts at strengthening the breadth and depth of financial inclusion in developing 
nations, access to financial services has not guaranteed increased usage of those services (Beck et 
al, 2005). Development of financial intermediaries has led to stronger economic development on 
a macro scale, but the results are less clear on an individual level. Beck has demonstrated that 
reducing financial hurdles does increase the usage of financial services such as loans. Yet the level 
of adoption of loans from formal financial institutions remains significantly low in developing 
economies (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012). 
Ironically, demand for credit – and insurance – in those economies is high (Murdoch, 1995). 
Policies have targeted the extent of financial penetration, and have sought to encourage the usage 
of services and the adoption of credit.  The reason for that is, in markets with proper insurance and 
credit, shocks do not affect households’ consumption, since borrowing and savings can smooth 
away the risk. Farmers in those markets, a key sample group in this research, do not alter their 
production methods (Murdoch, 1995). 
On the other hand, in markets where farmers face barriers against these services, risk aversion 
ensues. Farmers resort to conservative farming techniques. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1993) 
demonstrated that vulnerable households shifted their production into less profitable territories. 
For example, households at the lowest level of income would lose around 35 percent of their profit 
as a result of income smoothing. 
This paper attempts to determine the interrelated role that usage of different financial services 
– specifically savings and credit - plays on an individual’s vulnerability to shocks (and therefore 
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that individual’s ability to smooth away shocks). The paper covers the simultaneous correlation 
between these variables across different stages and the direction of the linkage between all three. 
Additionally, the paper addresses the different factors encouraging and hindering demand for these 
services and influencing people’s vulnerability to shocks. 
This research focuses on Kenya. Kenya has witnessed an increase in the number of weather 
shocks over the years, which severely impacts farmers’ vulnerability (IRLI 2007, Funk et. Al 
2010). In addition, a large portion of the population lives below the poverty line, with 80 percent 
of farmers categorized as subsistence farmers (World Bank 2012). Not surprisingly, these farmers 
have shown little adoption of loans from formal institutions. Policymakers have attributed this to 
the lack of access to formal sources of credit, yet only 9.67 percent of non-farmers in my sample, 
who supposedly have better access to credit, have taken out loans from formal lending sources. 
Therefore, I seek to determine the extent of which financial inclusion affects the usage of services 
such as savings and lending, and then proceed to analyze these services’ respective roles on 
people’s vulnerability, and vice versa. 
This analysis will also serve as a preliminary to the “SATISFy” project. This project seeks to 
introduce Kenyan farmers to Risk-Contingent Credit (RCC), a credit instrument with built-in 
insurance against weather shocks, with the intention of encouraging farmers to adopt loans or 
credit while minimizing their vulnerability. Since this paper analyzes the linkage between credit 
and vulnerability, it will help determine the potential demand for this product and the factors that 
could be driving it. 
This paper finds that Kenyans rely heavily on loans from informal sources, while the market 
for formal credit is extremely small and insignificant in its effect on the usage of other services 
and individuals’ perception of their own risk. Very little drives the demand for credit, for both 
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farmers and non-farmers. Neither financial inclusion, nor systematic characteristics such as cost 
of services or the documents required determine demand. Most literature would point to collateral 
requirements as a significant factor, and it is therefore important to note that the survey used did 
not measure that variable. 
Having a bank account and where respondents fell in terms of income quintile significantly 
influenced the level of savings, yet only with non-farmers. Credit and savings positively influenced 
each other, yet only significantly with credit’s influence on savings. Savings reduced one’s 
vulnerability across the board, yet credit displayed a positive effect on vulnerability. This result is 
isolated to informal credit – which is basically a cause of anxiety. Financial inclusion is clearly 
proven to be a weak determinant of usage of services and therefore vulnerability. 
Meanwhile, formal credit is a weak and untapped market, yet it is unclear if it is due to reluctant 
demand. In fact, I find strong evidence that points to a deficient supply of credit. There exists an 
asymmetric relationship between formal credit and vulnerability, and informal credit and 
vulnerability. The asymmetry explains the lack of borrowing as external credit rationing; farmers 
substitute formal loans for informal loans. In other words, the problem with credit is institutional, 
and in such a case, RCC is a likely solution.  
 
1.2: Overview of Kenya’s Agricultural Economy: 
Agriculture plays a prominent role in Kenya’s economy; it takes up 61 percent of employment 
as well as 29.3 percent of GDP. However, 80 percent of Kenyan farmers are poor in resources and 
highly vulnerable to the increasing number of weather shocks, such as drought, facing the country 
(World Bank 2012). As an illustration, twelve droughts were recorded between the years 1970 and 
2013, which averages out to one drought every 3.7 years. In fact, that number is expected to rise 
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with time as a result of climate change (ILRI 2007, Funk et. al 2010). These events expose farmers 
to a high level of risk, thus pushing them to rely on low-risk but low-yield farming. Despite the 
government’s attempts at tackling the issue by creating an early warning system for droughts and 
funding part of the recovery efforts after every weather event, its attempts have been inadequate. 
The agriculture sector becomes more vulnerable with every weather shock, increasing the need 
from farmers for social safety nets like insurance.  
Private commercial crop and livestock insurers have been reluctant to enter the Kenyan market 
due to the frequency of droughts and floods. However, there has been a rise in interest from 
international agencies, although they have yet to be successful. There has been very little uptake 
of insurance from farmers despite the agencies’ best efforts at spreading the word. 
1.3 Agricultural Land and Crops: 
The following graph presents the different uses of Kenyan land:  
                                Figure 1.1: Different Uses of Kenyan Land 
	
	
Only 9.7 % of the total land area is suitable for agricultural and it is located for the most part 
in the Central and South Western regions of Kenya.  
Since Kenya’s irrigation depends on rainfall, the areas considered arable are those with a high 
potential for rainfall (above 857 mm) and medium potential (between 612.5 and 857 mm). The 
agricultural calendar runs from one October to the next. It begins with the short-rains season that 
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includes planting in October and November, followed by a dry period for harvest in January and 
February. Then the long-rains season covers March till August, followed by another dry period 
between August and October.    
The food crops planted include most prominently sugar canes, potatoes, and maize. The 
following shows the top 10 food crops by production and value:  
Figure 1.2: The Top 10 Food Crops in Kenya  
 
 
1.4: Kenyan Farmers: 
According to the World Bank, 80 % of farmers are poor in resources: 
Table 1.1: Typology and Distribution of Farmers 
 
78 % of farmers, or 4 million households, are subsistence farmers. Commercial insurance is 
mostly targeted to semi-commercial and medium and large commercial producers, leaving a large 
segment of the market untapped. Additionally, a large proportion of the population lives below the 
poverty line. 
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Population by Level of Poverty      
                          
 
Not only do most farmers lack access to insurance, they also lack access to credit. This presents 
a major challenge. Most farmers function at low productivity levels, as their crop yield falls below 
potential and is at times on a decline. This is the result of farmers opting for low-yield but low-
risk crops. Falling for the poverty trap ensues. Credit could be the key to unlocking that, as it can 
improve crop yield through access to technology, as well as household income and household 
welfare. 
Yet Kenyan banks and other lenders are reluctant to approach the agriculture sector. The main 
sources of agriculture credit lending in Kenya are Government Finance Corporations, Equity Bank, 
and Savings and Credit Cooperatives. But Government Finance Corporations’ efforts deteriorated 
after 1980, while agriculture loans from banks took up only 5 % of lending in 2012. 
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Figure 1.4: Agriculture Loans in Kenya 
 
In addition to weather risk, the challenges facing these financial institutions in providing credit 
include missing information regarding the agricultural clientele, high transaction costs in rural 
areas due to poor infrastructure, and collateral limitations. However, this paper finds that the issue 
extends beyond the availability of credit, since individuals did not take out loans even when credit 
was made available.   
 
1.5 Objectives and Outline 
Given the importance of agriculture in Kenya’s economy, and the rudimentary credit and 
insurance institutions available to Kenyan farmers, this thesis seeks to investigate the degree by 
which Kenya’s agriculture sector is included within the financial sector, and how financial 
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inclusion translates into usage by farmers. Taking this as an overall objective, the specific 
objectives of this thesis are to: 
1. Analyze the relationship between the usage of credit, savings, and vulnerability in Kenya, 
and the direction of that linkage. 
2. Determine the factors influencing the usage of financial services. 
3. Determine the role institutions play on the individual’s access to these services. 
4. Extend my analysis to Risk-Contingent Credit. 
 
The paper is outlined as follows: chapter 2 consists of the literature review, discussing financial 
inclusion, Risk-Contingent Credit, and covers the background on credit and insurance. chapter 3 
presents the data used in this paper and an overview of the sample. Chapter 4 is the econometric 
model and the analysis of the results, followed by the conclusion.    
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction: 
I begin this literature review by covering the different aspects of financial inclusion, the core 
issue in this thesis. I then proceed to an overview of the structure of Risk-Contingent Credit, and 
a detailed analysis of the concept’s evolution and application. The third and final section of this 
review covers the role of credit and insurance in development. 
 
2.2 Financial Inclusion 
In this paper, I am interested in measuring the level of financial inclusion through usage on a 
household level across Kenya. Financial inclusion is a relatively new concept that is difficult to 
pigeonhole under one definition. It was introduced by the United Nations in 2005 as a measurement 
of the financial sector at a micro scale (Jiao	and	Chen,	2009). It generally seeks to gauge the depth 
and breadth of financial services.  
Financial depth refers to the size of formal financial institutions when compared to the size of 
the economy. Therefore, financial depth captures the households that are unable to access credit, 
or that are risk-rationed (Tan 1999; Wu 2005). On the other hand, financial breadth refers to the 
accessibility to financial services (Beck et al., 2000, 2007a). It is measured using the number of 
branches and the deposit accounts per capital (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011).  
Financial inclusion is best understood as a combination of financial breadth and depth, where 
each of these concepts is crucial in painting the entire picture. However, financial inclusion differs 
from breadth in its focus on the individual. It can be understood as the ease with which members 
of an economy can access available formal institutions and can use financial services such as credit 
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and deposits (Sarma and Pais, 2011; Beck,et al.,2000,2007b). In other words, financial inclusion 
is a measure of the access low-income groups on the fringes of an economy have to banking 
services, depending on availability and cost (Dev, 2006). It considers both access and usage, since 
one does not necessitate the other, and it is believed to encourage growth and development.  
According to Beck et al. (2007), economies with solid financial depth witness rapid growth 
and improved income equality, while financial exclusion hinders development. In fact, exclusion 
may result in continuous income inequality. The authors have also demonstrated that countries 
with an inclusive financial sector improved the income of the poorest fraction of the economy at a 
faster rate than countries with a weaker financial sector. Additionally, a large fraction of a 
country’s development can be traced back to the development of financial services.  
The specific channel through which financial inclusion leads to growth is still up for debate. 
Evidence points that it might not be through credit, but instead through a trickle down effect from 
an increased demand for labor. This is particularly interesting for our research that considers credit 
a stimulus for growth. In this literature, access to credit does not necessarily lead to a demand or 
usage of credit (Beck et al., 2008). It is therefore crucial to understand the climate of financial 
inclusion in Kenya, in order to better gauge the factors determining demand for RCCs amongst 
farmers.  
2.2.1 Factors Influencing Financial Inclusion: 
In this paper, I am interested in analyzing the variables determining people’s demand for credit 
and savings beyond accessibility, and then proceed to measure financial inclusion’s effect on 
vulnerability.  
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Similar literature has been rare, but scholars have studied the influences clients’ features have 
on inclusion, in addition to the features of micro-institutions and the environment as a whole. 
Informal lending between friends and relatives can replace formal credit even when the latter is 
made available (Turvey and Kong, 2011). As mentioned in earlier sections, collateral requirements 
can act as a form of hindrance to inclusion. Finally, household characteristics, such as age, level 
of education, and the gender of the household head, have been proven empirically to affect access 
to financial services (Turvey et al., 2011). They are therefore controlled for in my model in later 
chapters. 
Additionally, the lack of financial education can hinder the usage of financial services. A study 
of rural China found that the rural community relies on online banking half as much as other users, 
and this community barely accesses credit electronically (Turvey and Xiong, 2017). 
From an institutional perspective, financial products are relatively homogenous since services 
come at a high cost. As a result, the products are not tailored to the different financial needs of 
livestock farmers or crop growers, which results in a mismatch between supply and demand of 
services (Huang et al., 2009).  
On a broader scale, factors hindering inclusion include a lack of supply of services such as 
loans, where rural deposits are used for loans in urban areas (Han, 2009). High transaction costs 
and a lack of competition in the sector also factor in.  These issues relate to the over all 
environment, such as differences between banks in rural areas and urban areas, (Zhu et al., 2010) 
as well as the risk measures taken (Han, 2009). 
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2.2.2 On Financial Inclusion and Development: 
Beck et al. (2000) analyzed empirically the linkage between development of financial 
intermediaries and economic growth, as well as the growth of GDP per capita, capital per capita, 
productivity per capita, and savings rates. The approach is generally from a macroeconomic 
perspective, yet variables like the savings rate are of particular interest in this paper.  
The authors find that the development of financial intermediaries has a clear positive impact 
on GDP and factor productivity growth. The channel through which this occurs is the faster pace 
technological and production growth adopts with improved intermediaries. The results are less 
clear regarding the effect of intermediaries on savings and physical capital growth. In fact, the 
authors indicated that any impact intermediaries had on the savings rate was minimal. However, 
over all, improved intermediaries lead to an improved allocation of resources and stronger 
economic growth in the long run. 
Methodologically, the authors determined a simultaneity bias between the growth of 
intermediaries and the other measures of growth. This is relevant because, in this paper, I control 
for the endogeneity resulting from the simultaneity occurring between credit, savings, and 
vulnerability. In Beck’s paper, the authors relied on an instrument, the legal origin of the countries, 
to control for this bias. This was possible since their analysis was across multiple countries.  
Beck et al. (2005) offered the first empirical analysis of the positive relationship between 
economic development and the access and usage of financial services. It a more micro-level 
analysis as it relied on firm-level data. Although access to services did not guarantee usage of 
services, their findings did indicate that as financial hurdles dropped, a larger usage of banking 
and loan services was observed.  
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The authors measure financial access using data on the intensity of bank branches in 
geographical areas, and they measure usage based on the number of deposits and loans relative to 
GDP per capita. Although these are good predictors, these measures do not control for the multiple 
services used by one individual, they do not factor in informal institutions into their analysis, and 
they do not measure individuals’ reporting of usage.  
The results indicate that economies of scale help the outreach of banking services. In addition, 
government-owned banks exhibit smaller financial penetration. And finally, improved system of 
communication regarding the benefits of services lead to better outreach. 
Financial development also has an impact on income inequality. Development reduces 
inequality, and it disproportionately aids those in the poorest quintile. Beck et al. (2007) estimates 
that 40 % of the income growth of the poorest is the result of a drop in inequality. Additionally, 
development speeds up the reduction of the poverty in populations. The policy suggested by the 
authors entails applying reforms to the financial sector as it results in economic growth. 
Innovations such as the Risk-Contingent Credit piloted by the SATISFy project supporting this 
thesis follow the same logic in providing new financial services to alleviate the risk of poverty and 
promote growth. 
2.3 SATISFy Project 
As mentioned earlier, this research seeks to provide a stronger background on the relationship 
between financial services and the people in Kenya as part of the SATISFy project, which will 
introduce RCCs into Kenya’s financial market. 
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2.3.1 Overview of Risk-Contingent Credit: 
The main deterrent for development in Sub-Saharan Africa is the absence of credit due to 
uninsured risk. Uninsured risk diminishes small farmers’ productivity and agricultural 
development. In addition, insurance is also lacking despite proven need for it. Carter, Cheng, and 
Sarris (2011) demonstrated that credit and insurance cannot survive as separate entities. Both are 
in high demand and they recommended that both be interlinked. In a low collateral environment, 
uptake of collateral improved only when insurance was interlinked with the loan. Meanwhile, in 
high collateral environments, farmers were risk-rationed when insurance was missing, and little 
credit was adopted. When interlinked insurance was available, the collateral requirements were 
strongly relaxed by lenders. The authors therefore predicted that government subsidies could be 
applied in the final scenario. 
Similarly, we believe Risk-Contingent Credit (RCC) can be the product that unlocks farmers’ 
access to credit through its linkage with insurance, leading to improvement in farming, income, 
and finally welfare. Risk-Contingent Credit (RCC) is a structured financial instrument with a built-
in insurance on – in this case – weather and rainfall (Shee and Turvey, 2012; Shee, Turvey, and 
Woodard, 2015). When triggered, RCC transfers part of the loan borrower’s liability to the lender, 
therefore alleviating the borrower of the risk of default. It could be any credit instrument with an 
embedded contingent claim, and in the SATISFy project it is a put option on future rainfall 
imbedded within a traditional loan. The option meets the bank’s collateral requirement, and it is 
designed with a premium interest along with the loan interest rate. The premium interest depends 
on the volatility of the underlying risk.  
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The issue facing farmers put simply: 
Seasonal rainfall falls below a predetermined threshold causing a drought. What ensues is a 
shortage in crop yield. This results in a drop in income for farmers, who become unable to pay 
back the full loan amount. They are therefore at risk of losing their collateral. 
Farmers long the put option with the loan at a premium and receive the loan upfront. The put 
option is triggered when rainfall fails. If rainfall falls below the blue line threshold in the figure 
below, the option acts as a form of insurance against risk of default, since it helps repay the portion 
of the loan amount the farmer is unable to pay back. The farmer’s repayment obligation falls 
linearly as rainfall continues to drop. RCC’s payments are directed strictly towards the loan 
account. It therefore guarantees repayment of loan and creates lending that is “collateral-free”. If 
rainfall remains above the threshold, the farmer must pay back the entire loan along with the RCC 
premium interest. 
The loan is linked to insurance which has the characteristics of a put option to hedge against 
the risk of a drop in rainfall. It mimics an RCC for a drop in crop prices for example. However, 
the option linked to the loan would be a call option if the farmer were to manage the risk against 
excessive rain. 
RCC’s interest rate takes into account the indemnified risk, which makes it higher than the rate 
on a regular loan. Borrowers ought to be indifferent between the rate on RCCs and a rate on an 
operating loan with collateral requirements. 
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Figure 2.1: The Mechanics of RCCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benefits of RCCs to subsistence and small farmers: 
(1) Eliminates collateral risks and improves repayment ability in case of drought. 
(2) Credit improves access to technology which helps scale up production. 
(3) Farmers grow resilient since RCCs hedge against risk during production.  
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(4) Farmers with low liquidity can afford insurance since payments will not be made upfront. 
(5) Unlocks poverty trap and welfare increases. 
(6) Agricultural development occurs in the long run. 
The benefits to financial institutions are: 
(1) Agricultural lending much less risky. 
(2) Collateral requirements will drop or be eliminated. More farmers can become clients. 
(3) Broadening scope of lending by including the agricultural sector, since risk of default 
drops drastically. Credit availability depends on risk, such as that of weather, which is 
controlled for. 
 
2.3.2 Project Design 
This thesis is prepared separately from the implementation of RCCs which will take place at 
the start of the crop year in September of 2017. Nonetheless, in order to place this thesis within 
the overall context of the SATISFy project, I will provide an overview of the project’s goals. 
The delivery of RCCs to Kenyan farmers is set up as a Randomized Control Trial in order to 
isolate the treatment effect of RCCs and eliminate any systematic differences across participants. 
It will take place in Machakos and will involve a sample of 1080 households. The sample size is 
this large in order to avoid committing both a type 1 and type 2 error within the analysis. 
The farmers chosen are interested in seeking a loan for agricultural purposes, and they meet 
the bank’s loan appraisal process. Equal number of households are picked from every village. This 
sample is divided into equal number of control and treatment households from every village. This 
controls for any systematic difference across villages and communities.  
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The project opts for individual randomization instead of clustered since it assumes RCCs will 
not lead to competition. In addition, the current sample size would only allow for small clusters, 
and treatment occurs only at the household level. 
In order to control for any resentment between participants, the randomization will take place 
as a public lottery with Equity Bank.1 The sample of 1080 households will be divided into three 
groups: 
(1) Control group: 360 households who receive no credit. 
(2) Treatment group 1: 360 households who receive traditional credit. 
(3) Treatment group 2: 360 households who receive RCCs with different interests. 
                                         Figure 2.2 The Sample Groups 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The project expects the impact pathway to go as follows: 
(1) Farmers face drought risk and lack access to credit.  
																																																						
1	Equity	Bank	retails	RCCs	as	its	own	product.	The	insurance	component	will	be	underwritten	by	a	local	insurer	and	reinsured	by	
Swiss	Re.	For	the	first	year,	pilot	loan	amounts	will	be	limited	to	$	120	and	will	be	secured	by	funds	on	deposit	by	the	SATISFy	
project	and	IFPRI.	
Sample frame: 1080 households who are seeking loans and fit the the 
bank’s requirements. 
Treatment 2:  
360 households 
 
Risk contingent credit; 
randomly varied RCC 
interest rate 
 
Treatment 1:  
360 households 
Traditional credit 
  
Control:  
360 households 
No credit 
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(2) A drought index is set up for the RCC, and personal information on farmers are collected. 
The information covers their farming situation, household characteristics, level of 
resilience and risk aversion. 
(3) Risk Contingent Credit is implemented along with Equity Bank. 
(4) Uptake leads to improvement in crop production. Access to better resources leads to 
production at lower risk and with better technology. 
(5) Household income and welfare increase. Resilience against shocks improves.  
As a first step, eligible farmers are selected, and they are surveyed by a partner, Tegemeo, before 
the lottery begins.    
 
2.4.1 On Credit and Index-Based Insurance: 
In the absence of insurance, rural farmers resort to informal mechanisms to insure against 
shocks. However, these mechanisms come at the expense of profitability, and hinders the adoption 
of advanced and profitable farming practices. Their income ends up lower than it would have been 
had insurance been available. 
In Rosenzweig and and Wolpin’s (1993) paper, the authors analyzed the impact of imperfect 
financial markets on the risk management and consumption smoothing of farmers. They examined 
farmers’ investments in bullocks, one of the main production factors in India and one of the main 
non-asset holdings. When encountered with shocks, farmers prioritized consumption smoothing 
and sold the bullocks, at times at low prices. These sales jeopardized the future income of farmers. 
In other cases, such as that of China, evidence indicated that farmers valued income smoothing. In 
order to hedge against the risk of shocks, they therefore grew less sow when provided with only 
inefficient insurance. (Jalan et al, 1999) These scenarios demonstrated how ineffective informal 
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mechanisms were in allowing for productivity, growth, and in preventing the poverty trap, and 
they encouraged access to insurance and credit. 
In fact, the literature predicts that demand for insurance and credit in developing economies is 
high. According to Murdoch (1995), in markets with proper insurance and credit, shocks will not 
affect households’ consumption, since borrowing and savings can smooth away the risk. Farmers 
in those markets would not alter their production methods. 
On the other hand, in markets where farmers face barriers against these services, risk aversion 
ensues. Farmers resort to conservative farming techniques. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1993) 
demonstrated that vulnerable households shifted their production into less profitable territories. 
For example, households at the lowest level of income would lose around 35 percent of their profit 
as a result of income smoothing. Therefore, interest in insurance and credit grew.  
Index-based insurance is the most revered form of insurance. Interest in index-based insurance 
began after individual assessed insurance was disregarded. Hazzell et al. (1986) exposed the flaws 
of claim-based agricultural insurance, which was initially thought to be the best type of safety net. 
This insurance program was too costly since it required individual assessment of damage. 
Additionally, there was a risk of asymmetry with information between the buyer and the seller, as 
well as moral hazard. Other difficulties included heterogeneity of farms and crops, and the risk of 
insurers failing to provide enough liquidity to cover significant weather shocks that spanned 
regions.  
Index insurance refers to indemnity payments that depend on thresholds set through an 
underlying index. Index insurance could target area crop yield or rainfall. It is especially 
convenient for poor regions which lack access to regular insurance since it lowers the transaction 
costs behind assessing losses. (Chantarat et al, 2009) Additionally, index-insurance eliminates 
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moral hazard – since indemnities depend on regional indices, and transfers insurance companies’ 
risk to the international market. Insurance companies could be reinsured since insurance is based 
on a legitimate index.  
Index-insurance should also lower basis risk. Basis risk refers to a low correlation between 
individual losses and the index, which increases the risk of one’s losses going uninsured. It 
decreases since one contract can be linked to multiple weather stations (Norton et al, 2015).  Basis 
risk therefore reduces insurance demand, and lowers demand elasticity. (Marr et al, 2016)  The 
benefits of index-insurance when taken on its own (i.e. not linked to anything) include diverting 
investment into riskier but more profitable crops. It also diminishes credit rationing, and improves 
farmers’ welfare, particularly the poor. (Marr et al, 2016)  
To create such an agriculture insurance program, Belanger (2016) created a general roadmap 
consisting of 13 concepts crucial to rendering the program successful.  
Figure 2.3: The 13 Concepts to an Insurance Program 
 
 Based	on	Hatch	et	al	2013.	
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Our project has abided by many of these concepts: 
(1) Think long term: Setting up the baseline survey began in October 2016, although managing 
the details of the product with Equity Bank dates back to before that. The pilot is expected 
to end in April 2018, only after which enough information is gathered to set up and release 
the product. 
(2) Understand the risks: Through town meetings in different villages, members of the project 
met with farmers to understand the types of shocks they were most vulnerable to. It turned 
out weather shocks, and drought in particular, were the main sources of risk with crop 
farming. In addition, NDVI data, historical yields, and drought shocks data were gathered 
to corroborate those claims. 
(3) Without demand there is no program: During the town meetings, farmers expressed interest 
in the product. In addition, Shee, Turvey, and Woodard’s field games in Kenya 
demonstrated farmers’ interest in the product. The main purpose of this paper is to quantify 
and gauge the farmers’ interest.  
(4)  Multiple ministries should be engaged and laws; regulations and policies transcend 
politics; government and private sector collaboration strengthens the program: The project 
goes in line with Kenya’s Vision2030 project for long term development. It helps in 
achieving economic growth and social development. 
(5) No single insurance product is a panacea: Farmers in Kenya grow fruits as well as maize 
and corn in the same field. The insurance product is therefore being tailored to cover the 
different types of crops based on an index, and the rates will also differ based on season. 
(6) The devil is in the details: The product’s mechanism is simple, and volunteers are traveling 
to villages in order to properly explain how RCCs work to farmers. 
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(7) Be self critical:  This stage of the project is a pilot. Its purpose is to assess what we are 
providing and tweak accordingly. 
(8) The tortoise wins the race: As mentioned earlier, the project is moving at a cautious pace 
but for good measure. For example, after the Haitian earthquake in 2010, a rice insurance 
pilot, Systeme de Financement d’Assurances Agricoles en Haiti (SYFAAH), was launched 
in order to improve farmers’ yields. At first, only 149 farmers were insured. But between 
2014’s second cropping season and 2015’s first, there was 171% increase in the number of 
farmers insured. (Belanger, 2016).  
Yet, even after a proper creation of an agriculture insurance product, adoption has been low. 
According to Marr et al (2016) (adoption and impact of insurance) demand has ranged from 2 to 
40 %, and at times at less than 0.25%. One of the main culprits is credit constraint. As an example, 
Gine et al. demonstrated credit constraint’s negative effect on the uptake of index insurance. (2008) 
They analyzed the uptake of an inexpensive rainfall insurance product that provided a payout to 
farmers during the three phases of the monsoon season in southern India. It was provided by 
BASIX, a microfinance institution. One of the main reasons for not purchasing the insurance was 
a lack of sufficient credit, as 21% of respondents had reported. Additionally, their probit model 
showed that credit constraint negatively affected the uptake, and the estimator was significant at 
the 1 % level. The authors then recommended that the insurance be paired with a loan in order to 
help these respondents. In other words, they encouraged microcredit as a solution to the problem. 
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2.4.2 Credit and Insurance:  
It has been shown that access to credit increases willingness-to-pay and take up of insurance 
(Marr et al, 2016). In Carter et al’s model (2011), the authors found that wealthy farmers with high 
collateral were risk rationed and therefore did not borrow unless insurance was available. That was 
the result of lower default rates. On the other hand, farmers with low collateral were said to be 
price rationed and borrowed only when interest rates were low, and stand alone insurance did not 
alter their behavior. Carter argued that interlinked contracts encouraged farmers with both low or 
high collateral to adopt high technology practices in their farming. 
Better technology leads to higher consumption rates in the long run, while households with 
traditional technology lag behind. Although providing credit and insurance separately has 
exhibited larger take-up than when they are interlinked, a bundled product, such as contingent 
credit, has exhibited lower default rates (Farrin and Miranda, 2013). As a result, these contracts 
encourage lenders to supply more credit and lower quantity rationing. Another determinant of 
lower default rates is whether the bank is the initial receiver of the indemnity payments. Farrin and 
Miranda (2013) studied two scenarios; one where the borrower received the indemnity first, and 
another scenario where the bank was the first to receive it. In the first scenario, the indemnities 
improved the household’s disposable wealth, which increased the likelihood of default and 
therefore the lender’s risk. However, when the bank received the indemnity first, such that the 
insurance was a form of contingent credit, default was much lower. Therefore, contingent credit is 
most reliable since it encourages adoption of technology while controlling for risk of default. 
However, bundling insurance and credit in all its forms was contested by Karlan et al (2014) 
The authors assigned Ghanaian farmers either cash grants, rainfall insurance grants, or both 
together. They found a strong response to the insurance grant and little response to the cash grant. 
32	
	
In addition, the farmers who received both invested the same as those with just insurance. These 
results highlighted the hindering role uninsured risk played in investment decisions, while it 
diminished the importance of liquidity constraints since farmers managed to find credit and cash 
investments once they were insured. 
 
2.4.3 Evolution of RCCs: 
Many developing countries have relied heavily on one or two commodities for their earnings, 
which has rendered them vulnerable to changes in price. Between 1931 and 1982, this issue was 
addressed on a broad market scale through the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs), 
which raised prices across markets whenever there was a slump. However, ICAs died due to 
difficulties in setting prices, and focus shifted towards risk management at an individual level. For 
example, there was an increased interest in the futures market, since, as Morgan (2001) 
documented, it could provide producers anticipatory hedging and price support at a premium. 
Morgan proceeded to demonstrate that producers in developing nations lacked access to 
commodity futures since domestic exchanges were unavailable. But the high level of adoption of 
commodity futures by producers in developed nations signified that there was a high demand for 
such a product to manage risk, only when it was available though. 
RCCs represent the latest efforts in targeting individual producers for risk management. The 
concept itself is relatively new but not uncommon. The earliest mention of such a product was in 
1986, when banks in the Philippines and India were required to increase their loans to the 
agriculture sector up to a certain percentage. In order to minimize lenders’ risk of default, either a 
government agency guaranteed to reimburse part of the loan, or an intermediary offered crop 
insurance that managed reimbursement when crops got damaged. However, this project was 
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flawed as it required the government to pay large subsidies, and a large staff was required to verify 
the crop damages (Adams et al., 1986).  
Skees and Barnett (2006) introduced the concept of Index-Based Risk Transfer Products, 
which could be structured as options to transfer risk across multiple parties. The challenges it faced 
were the high costs to reach farmers in rural areas, and the basis risk inherent within it. It was 
applied in areas like India, where the MFI was retailing insurance on rainfall, while relying on 
risk-transfer products against risk of default. In Mongolia, the government introduced a livestock 
insurance for herders. If mortality rates of livestock rose beyond 7 %, herders received payments 
covered by both the government and the insurer. But the product was not tied to lending. Other 
examples included risks in Peru related to El Nino. 
Theoretically, structuring the precedents of RCCs could be traced back to Schwartz in 1982 as 
he presented an option pricing theory. In 2002, Jin and Turvey followed up by discussing these 
commodity-linked bonds and the potential for adoption in agriculture. They described the product 
as a debt instrument contingent on the outcome of commodities. Aside from the commodity-linked 
mortgages offered by Canada’s Farm Credit Corporation, few known applications of such a 
product were available to farmers. The authors proceeded to develop a theoretical pricing model 
based on Schwartz’s using real data and Monte Carlo simulations. They concluded that the product 
can reduce financial risk – or degree of leverage - when faced with business risk - volatility of 
return on assets. The purpose of the paper was to encourage applying the model on mortgages and 
amortized loans with farmers. 
Later, Shee and Turvey (2012) conducted a simulation in India which addressed market and 
pulse crop price risks facing farmers, and they set up the structure for RCCs. Despite efforts from 
the Indian government to encourage lending, crop price changes had led many to default on their 
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loans and lose valuable fixed assets. RCC can control for credit rationing that naturally ensued, 
and it can help lift credit caps from formal lenders. In the paper, the authors balanced out in their 
design the lender’s tradeoff between collateral and higher interest rates. The borrower must decide 
between taking a loan at a higher interest rate with a similarly large chance of default, or a lower 
interest rate with an increased likelihood of losing collateral. But RCCs transfer the risk of default 
on a third party. Through their simulation and using real data on various pulse crops, the authors 
proved that the premium interest rates of the RCCs changed with volatility of the commodity. The 
higher the volatility, the higher the risk, the more compensation was required by the lender. They 
also concluded that it provided protection on downside risk for these farmers on crop revenue. 
Additionally, RCCs can improve minimum income. 
 
2.4.4	Applied	Research	on	RCCs:	Case	Studies		
	
Gine and Yang’s (2009) field experiment with insured loans in Malawi was one of the few 
applications of a product that strongly resembled RCCs. They addressed the market imperfection 
where uninsured borrowers avoided taking loans due to risks of default. They sought to encourage 
farmers to adopt an advanced high-yielding yet risky hybrid maize and groundnut seeds in order 
to stimulate development. They randomly divided 800 maize and groundnut farmers into two 
groups: a control group that is offered a loan for such seeds without rainfall insurance, and a 
treatment group that is offered a loan with insurance in case rainfall failed. The authors had 
anticipated that the insured loan would be more effective in encouraging the risk-averse farmers 
to adopt these seeds. Yet the take-up of the insured loan was surprisingly much lower than that of 
the uninsured. The explanation they offered was related to the implicit insurance embedded in the 
uninsured contract. If a farmer’s income is low enough, it limits his/her liability, and he/she would 
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opt for the uninsured loan instead of the hybrid seeds. The explicitly insured loan is too expensive, 
and the farmer will grow regular seeds instead. As for the farmers who took up the insured loans, 
education and wealth were key positive factors. Yet those factors were insignificant with uninsured 
loans. 
Another application was a pilot experiment in rural Ghana by Karlan, Kutsoati, McMillan, and 
Udry (2011). The main reason farmers in Ghana were refraining from taking loans was reported 
to be the volatile crop prices. Through a randomized trial, 50 % of farmers were offered a loan that 
included at no added cost an indemnification on crop prices; if prices fell below a threshold, 
borrowers were relieved of paying back half the loan. The other group was offered a traditional 
loan. There results showed no significant difference between groups on take-up. In fact, if farmers 
were expecting crop prices to fall, they were less likely to take up the indemnified loan. This was 
possibly due to pessimism regarding the treatment loan. In addition, farmers who took up the 
indemnified loan did not exhibit higher investment in inputs. The authors offered few explanations; 
either the banks were already lenient on default, or prices were more stable than initially thought. 
Clearly, more research needed to be done. 
In Kenya, Shee, Turvey, and Woodard (2015) conducted field studies across counties through 
field games involving RCCs. The games were there in order for the authors to gain insight on risk, 
credit, and potential for research and product development. What the authors found was that there 
was a high interest and demand for RCCs across all groups from all counties. They all exhibited a 
willingness to pay the premium in exchange for the benefits RCCs provided, especially when 
addressing their different problems. 
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2.4.5 Theoretical Models: 
The first step is to analyze the financial and business risks of small agricultural businesses with 
high income volatility as a result of weather instability.  
E(ROE) = E(ROA) (A/E) – i (D/E)       (2.1) 
E(ROE) is the expected return on equity, and this equation represents its relationship with 
expected return on assets (ROA), as weighted by assets (A), equity (E), and debt (D). By setting 
this equation equal to zero, we can derive the breakeven ROA: 
  (2.2) 
Critical ROA could be considered a definition of financial risk. It is the probability boundary 
below which operating income falls short of satisfying financial obligations. Therefore, financial 
risk is the risk that return on asset falls below the critical value: 
(2.3) 
Should the interest rate and/or debt to asset ratio increase, the financial risk increases as well. 
To reduce this risk, hedging with options lowers the probability in the lower tail. (Turvey et al, 
2012) 
 
Since the price of the RCC can be fully hedged, it can be priced using simple equations. Farmers 
require operating loans which they can pay back after selling what they have harvested. Therefore, 
the present value of a traditional operating loan without an imbedded option can be written as: 
     (2.4) 
where f is the borrowed amount and i is the discount rate. 
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On the other hand, our RCC is an operating loan contract with a commodity option embedded 
onto it in order to insure against farmers’ repayment abilities. Its present value can be written as: 
   𝐵 = 𝑒$%∗' − 	𝜓[𝑀𝑎𝑥 0, 𝑍 − 𝑅 𝑇 ])								(2.5) 
where Z is the strike price, P(T) is the price of the commodity at time T, and  𝜓 =	 :;$<	(')           (2.6) 
By equating both equations to each other, B=B1, we can derive the interest rate for the loan with 
an embedded insurance: 
𝑖∗ = >?[	@	A[BCD	 E,FGH I ]J K	L M∗∗ I'    (2.6) 
where	E[Max(0,	Z-R(T))]	represents	the	put	option’s	value.	i*	is	referred	to	as	the	risk-adjusted	
interest	rate,	and	it	comes	at	a	premium	when	compared	to	that	of	a	traditional	loan	(Shee	and	
Turvey,	2012).		
	
2.4.6 Remote Sensing: 
The index for rainfall determining when the RCC will be triggered will depend on the 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). NDVI is a satellite measure of greenness of 
vegetation on the surface of Earth. (Turvey et al, 2012) NDVI gives a unitless value ranging from 
-1 to 1 to determine the health of the vegetation. As soil improves from bare to healthy, the number 
increases. NDVI data is data that is provided in real time, which is crucial for determining when 
and if the put option gets triggered. In this project with this product, the NDVI data relied upon 
covers rainfall, temperature, as well as soil moisture. 
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When it comes to remote sensing, its uptake in private insurance has been generally low, 
mostly due to a lack of understanding of its potential uses. (De Leeuw et al, 2014) Unlike claim-
based insurance where premiums are determined through historical data, index insurance allows a 
lot of room for remote sensing adoption, such as NDVI.  
Index insurance refers to indemnity payments that depend on thresholds set through an 
underlying index. Index insurance could target area crop yield or rainfall. It is especially 
convenient for poor regions which lack access to regular insurance since it lowers the transaction 
costs behind assessing losses and the risk of moral hazard from claim-based insurance. (Chantarat 
et al, 2009) NDVI offers index insurers verifiable information, that are available in real time and 
are not costly, and can act as the bases for setting up the underlying index. It could then potentially 
lead to index insurance widening its spread of the market and at a lower cost. However, it is unclear 
if it can lower the basis risk inherent in index insurance. Index insurance does not cover loss on an 
individual level if market-wide loss isn’t observed. It is unclear if NDVI can control for that since 
continuity of data is not certain. Additionally, the farther the farms are from the weather station, 
the smaller the correlation between data and crops. 
However, on the crop insurance level, the trust in NDVI grows even murkier. For example, in 
Zimbabwe, Makaudze and Miranda (2010) found the correlation between NDVI and growth of 
crops to vary greatly according to district location and type of crop. Turvey and McLaurin set out 
to study NDVI’s application through case studies across different locations. They found a large 
variation in the correlation between NDVI and precipitation. Similarly, the relationship between 
NDVI and extreme heat, as well as vegetation conditions, was very unstable across locations. Yet 
that is not to say that correlation between NDVI and rainfall, as well NDVI and extreme heat, 
renders NDVI unusable. NDVI can be put to good use in small regions for rainfall, and in particular 
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regions, it is a great measure for extreme heat. It is effective in areas that are mostly grasslands 
and pastures. In fact, the authors do clarify that NDVI has proven to be effective in certain projects, 
and these flaws do not disqualify it from its potential uses. 
For example, an ex-ante assessment of an Index Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) in Kenya 
proved the product could be quite successful but under certain conditions. (Chantarat et al, 2009) 
The study investigated the performance of IBLI in Northern Kenya through simulations. In 
Northern Kenya, livestock represents households’ wealth, and therefore livestock mortality poses 
the greatest risk to households’ financial prosperity. IBLI indemnity payments are triggered 
according to livestock mortality rates relative to pre-specified thresholds. 
The simulation showed that IBLI works best for the vulnerable non-poor households. It also 
found demand to be quite price elastic, and the authors therefore recommended partial 
subsidization in order to protect those vulnerable of falling into a poverty trap. 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
Financial inclusion is a relatively recent concept, and yet the literature has repeatedly 
demonstrated its positive impact on the welfare and growth of an economy. Although the literature 
on the impact of the usage of financial services on an individual is scarce, certain household and 
institutional characteristics have surfaced as clear determinants of demand for such services. 
With the regard to Risk-Contingent Credit, there have been attempts at implementing similar 
products, yet they have not been successful. That being said, I demonstrated that the literature on 
the crucial role of credit and insurance in development is excessive and definitive.    
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CHAPTER III 
DATA 
3.1 Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the conceptual basis of financial inclusion and the 
relationship between financial inclusion and the goals and objectives of the SATISFy project. The 
relationship between financial services, consumption, and vulnerability was discussed, and the 
means and methods of implementing RCCSs on a pilot basis was reviewed. 
The focus on financial inclusion in this thesis is a precursor to the baseline survey and 
implementation of the RCC product outlined in the SATISFy project. That works begins in May 
2017, as this thesis was being completed. 
The thesis is taking a broader view of Kenya with the aim of identifying key economic 
relationships and analyzing the difference between farming and non-farming households. To 
achieve this objective, I use the individual responses to the World Bank Global Financial Inclusion 
survey in Kenya (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012). This data is used in the regression models that 
follow. This chapter describes and summarizes the data. 
 
3.2 The Global Financial Inclusion Database: 
The cross-country data captures the different measures participants take in managing their 
finances with the available institutions. In Kenya, it consisted of survey data with a thousand 
randomly selected participants age 15 and above. The dataset itself has been used internationally, 
encompassing 148 countries, ranging from high income to low income economies. (Demirguc-
Kunt, Klapper, 2012) 
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The data is considered a tool to help provide empirical evidence for policy-makers to help 
facilitate their decision-making. It can be used to feed into the scarce literature connecting financial 
access and development. This dataset is particularly helpful since it clearly compartmentalizes 
population segments into income quintiles, therefore easily identifying the poor segments of an 
economy. Additionally, it captures financial penetration and usage at an individual level, which 
deflates the numbers otherwise generated by a household level dataset, since the latter does not 
factor in women and youth.  
The data was collected through face-to-face interviews in countries where telephone coverage 
reaches less than 80 percent of the population. Individuals are selected randomly through random 
route procedures, and they are required to be noninstitutionalized civilians (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Klapper, 2012). 
3.2.1 Survey Description: 
The survey details different aspects of participants’ usage of services. Participants cover all 
income quintiles, and they include both farmers and non-farmers. The survey determines whether 
these participants have accounts at institutions, and whether they have used services such as debit 
or credit cards, and their reasons behind it. 
It continues by following their account deposits and transactions, their savings, and also their 
reasoning. It follows suit with similar questions but for credit, while determining whether loans 
are taken up from formal or informal sources. The questions also detail whether participants 
receive wages through farming or different forms of employment. Additionally, participants 
determine their perception of their own risk and how they would manage it. 
The survey does involve a tangential segment on mobile and online banking, but these answers 
are not particularly relevant for this study.  
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3.3 Overview of Financial Access Internationally: 
It is estimated that 2.5 billion adults do not have an account at a formal financial institution 
globally, most of them in middle and low income economies. A mere 41 percent of adults in 
developing countries have an account, while 89 percent in high income economies do (Demirguc-
Kunt, Klapper, 2012).  
Economies with high GDP per capita exhibit the largest account penetration, yet national 
income does not explain certain trends in developing areas. For example, developing countries 
face a clear gender gap, as 9 percent more men than women have a formal account at an institution 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012). Adults in the top 20 percent income quintile of those countries 
are twice as likely to gain access to those institutions than adults in the poorest quintile. Most 
commonly cited barriers for access in developing areas include cost of services, distance from 
institutions, and the paperwork required. 
Internationally, access to accounts, and therefore institutions, looks as follows: 
Figure 3.1 Account Penetration Across Areas 
 
As expected, the main area of interest in this thesis - Africa in general and Kenya in particular 
– is represented on the lower end of the spectrum. 
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With regards to credit, 14 percent of adults in high income countries have taken out loans from 
formal institutions, while that estimate drops to 8 percent with adults from developing areas. 
Similarly, most adults would resort to informal loans in case of emergencies in developing areas 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012). 
The following graph represents the different forms of lending internationally: 
Figure 3.2 Sources of Lending Internationally 
 
While formal lending is well-represented in wealthy economies, informal lending plays a large 
role in Africa. 
3.4 A Closer Look at Africa: 
500 million adults in Africa remain excluded from the formal financial sector (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Klapper, 2012). Account penetration changes across regions as shown below: 
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Figure 3.3 Account Penetration Across Africa 
 
Our project focuses on Kenya, and its sub-region, Eastern Africa, exhibits an account penetration 
of a mere 28 percent of adults. 
Figure 3.4 Account Penetration by Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Across regions, it appears that gender, age, location of services, and income levels create a 
discrepancy in access to institutions. I therefore will be controlling for these factors in my model 
specific for Kenya. 
Source: Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012	
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As for credit, only 5 percent of adults in Africa have reported borrowing from formal 
institutions, while 38 percent rely on lending from friends and families. Other forms of informal 
lending include employers and stores permitting sales on credit. Interestingly, wealth is not 
considered a determinant of the type of loan taken. The reasons for loans include funerals or 
weddings, school fees, and most abundantly for emergency purposes (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 
2012). 
 
3.5 Analysis of the Sample: 
 
The following analysis serves to paint a clear picture of the Kenya sample and its composition. 
My main purpose in this paper is to determine the factors affecting financial inclusion, and the 
latter’s effect on vulnerability. Before we can introduce RCCs to Kenyan farmers, it is best to 
understand the economy’s level of inclusion and riskiness. These attributes help determine the 
demand for the product, and its potential for success.  
 
The sample consists of 968 observations, spread around Kenya, covering different economic 
and social classes. The sample is split almost equally between farmers and non-farmers, and 
between men and women. Farmers, the group the RCCs are targeted towards, represent 48.04 % 
of the sample. Meanwhile, women take up 51.55 % of the observations, and men 48.45%. 
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Figure 3.5 Farmers vs Non-Farmers Composition 
  
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
The survey determines 5 different income quintiles, each taking up 20 percent of the national 
income. All quintiles are represented in this survey, yet there is a noticeable difference between 
the second quintile, with a mere 15.5 %, and the largest quintiles taking up around 48.35 % of the 
sample. 
Figure 3.6 Distribution of Sample by Quintiles 
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With	regards	to	education,	the	majority	of	this	sample	has	received	secondary	education,	and	
only	6.618	%	of	this	sample	has	gone	beyond	that.		
	
3.5.1 Credit, Savings, and Vulnerability: 
 
The core of this paper is identifying the factors that influence credit, savings, and vulnerability, 
and the simultaneous effect these three variables have on each other. Credit and savings are the 
main focus of this paper, yet institutional penetration – through accounts for deposits - clearly 
plays a big role with this form of inclusion.  
Figure 3.7 Sample percentage with an Account 
	
	
60.02	 %	 of	 this	 sample,	 which	 includes	 both	 farmers	 and	 non-farmers	 from	 all	 income	
quintiles	reported	having	an	account.	
When	asked	for	the	reasons	some	don’t	have	an	account,	most	reported	it’s	due	to	a	lack	of	
funds	and	the	number	of	documents	required.	In	addition,	some	blamed	the	distance	from	the	
institutions,	the	cost	of	services,	and,	to	a	much	smaller	degree,	their	trust	in	institutions.	Such	
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factors	could	also	be	large	determinants	of	credit	and	savings,	yet	the	survey	never	made	that	
connection.	
Figure	3.8	Reasons	for	Not	Having	an	Account	
	
In	regards	to	savings,	the	most	reported	reason	for	savings	was	education	fees,	while	saving	for	
farming	or	business	purposes	trailed	closely	behind.		
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Figure	3.9	Reasons	for	Saving	
	
	
3.5.2 Formal vs. Informal Loans: 
 
With credit, there exists a large gap between loans taken from formal institutions and from 
informal methods. 
Figure 3.10 Formal vs. Informal Loans 
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Only 11.66 percent of all respondents took loans from formal institutions, while 68.5 percent 
relied on informal methods such as friends and relatives, employers, and business selling on credit. 
The	main	reason	for	borrowing	is	reported	to	be	medical	purposes,	followed	by	education	
fees	and	farming	and	business	purposes.		
Figure	3.11	Reasons	for	Borrowing	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51	
	
3.5.3 Farmers Vs Non-Farmers: 
 
The following table presents the differences between farmers and non-farmers in usage of credit  
and other financial services: 
Table 3.1 Differences between Farmers and Non-Farmers 
Variable	 Percentage	 Standard	Deviation	 T-Test	for	difference	between	means	
Savings	 	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 69.5	%	 0.461	 Significant	with	p-
value	of	0	Farmers	 86.3	%	 0.344	
	 	 	 	
Emergency	Saving	 	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 23.6	%	 0.425	 Insignificant	with	p-
value	of	0.757	Farmers	 22.8	%	 0.42	
	 	 	 	
Credit	 	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 72.9	%	 0.445	 Significant	with	p-
value	of	0	Farmers	 87.5	%	 0.331	
	 	 	 	
Loan	Formal	 	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 9.67	%	 0.295	 Insignificant	with	p-
value	of	0.0647	Farmers	 13.4	%	 0.342	
	 	 	 	
Loan	Informal		 	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 61.3	%	 0.487	 Significant	with	p-
value	of	0	Farmers	 75	%	 0.433	
	
Vulnerable	
	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 44.5	%	 0.497	 Insignificant	with	p-
value	of	0.572	Farmers	 38.5	%	 0.487	
	 	 	 	
Institution	Account		 	 	 	
Non-Farmers	 55.48	%	 0.497	 Significant	with	p-
value	of	0.006	Farmers	 64	%	 0.48	
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Based on these statistics, significantly more farmers than non-farmers have had savings, yet 
both rely almost equally on savings for emergencies, although only  22-23 % of each of the two 
group do so.  
More farmers rely on credit, since 87.5 % of them reported they’ve borrowed in some form, 
which is significantly larger than the 72.9 % of non-farmers. However, as expected, a very small 
percentage of each of these groups took loans from institutions. Only 9 percent of non-farmers and 
13 percent of farmers took formal loans, and that difference is insignificant, meaning both 
approach institutional loans similarly.  
Figure 3.12 Differences between Farmers and Non-farmers 
 
The percentage of farmers and non-farmers taking out informal loans rises significantly, with 
75 percentage of farmers borrowing through informal means. With vulnerability, only 38-44 
percent of these group consider themselves vulnerable.  
 
53	
	
To minimize their vulnerability, the majority of both groups would opt for informal loans first 
– that is if these means are available. 
Figure 3.13 Emergency Funds for Non-Farmers 
 
Figure 3.14 Emergency Funds for Farmers 
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3.5.4 Income Quintiles:  
The distribution of farmers across quintiles strongly resembles that of the whole population: 
Figure 3.15 Distribution of Farmers by Quintiles 
 
The following tables and graphs show the sample’s usage of services across quintiles: 
Table 3.2: Differences between Quintiles 
	 Poorest	
Quintile	
Richest	Quintile	 	 Testing	Significance	of	
Difference	
	
Saving	
	
73.88	%	 85.06	%	 	 Significant	with	p-value	of	0.005	 	
Loan	Formal	
	
5.73	%	 15.76	%	 	 Significant	with	p-value	of	0.002	 	
Loan	Informal	
	
65.6	%	 70.95	%	 	 Insignificant	with	p-value	of	
0.87	
	
Vulnerable	 54.77	%	 21.57	%	 	 Significant	with	p-value	of	0	 	
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Despite a drop in the second quintile, it appears that as income rises, more members of that 
income group begin to save. Additionally, 85.06% of people from the richest quintile saved, which 
is significantly larger than the poorest quintiles 73.88 %. 
Figure	3.16	Savings	Across	Quintiles	
	
	
 
As for formal loans, the percentage of people taking out formal loans rises with the income 
groups significantly, although it remains low with only 15.76 % at the richest quintile. With 
informal loans, it appears that people take out these loans regardless of income groups, with the 
bars reaching almost the same heights, and the difference between the poorest and richest groups 
remaining insignificant.  
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Figure 3.17 Formal Loans Across Quintiles 
	
	
	
Figure	3.18	Informal	Loans	Across	Quintiles	
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Finally,	 it	appears	more	people	 in	higher	 income	groups	perceive	themselves	as	safe	from	
shocks	 thanks	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 funds.	 The	 gap	between	 the	 percentage	of	 people	 in	 the	
richest	group	and	the	poorest	group	is	quite	significant.	
Figure	3.19	Vulnerability	Across	Quintiles	
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned earlier, access to financial services and usage of services are separate concepts. 
In this paper, I wish to determine the effects different factors have on Kenyans’ usage of two main 
services, credit and savings, and their resulting effect on vulnerability. This helps us understand 
the connection between these services and vulnerability at an individual level, which has scarce 
literature backing it. Only through a proper understanding of the roles credit and vulnerability play 
with each other can we tackle farmers’ vulnerabilities through RCCs.  
 
4.2 Simultaneous-Equation Estimation: 
My model consists of an analysis of the correlation of simultaneous variables in a three stage 
least square estimation model. Credit, savings, and vulnerability are simultaneously determined by 
an interrelated series of equations, rendering them individually endogenous and therefore 
inconsistent.  
Simultaneity bias between financial intermediaries and savings has been controlled for in many 
of the literature, normally through instrumental variables as the data was either panel data or cross-
country. Additionally, savings and credit show a significant correlation in the following correlation 
matrix, as does the vulnerability variable and the savings variable: 
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Table 4.1 Correlation Matrix 
 Savings	 Credit	 Vulnerable	
Savings	 1	 	  
    
    
Credit	 0.329*	 1	 	
 (0)	 	  
    
Vulnerable	 -0.196*	 -0.043	 1	
	 (0)	 (0.181)	 	
                                      P-values in parentheses 
As for the relationship between credit and vulnerability, the literature is extensive. A market 
with full credit services can allow for consumption smoothing to easily occur in case of a shock, 
therefore reducing risk or vulnerability. Meanwhile, vulnerability is a determinant of whether 
demand for credit exists – regardless of actual usage. 
 
The three-stage simultaneous equation system is set up the following way:  
 																						𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 	𝛼 + 	𝛽	𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 	𝛽2	𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 	𝛽4	𝑍1 + 	𝛽5	𝑍2 + 	𝜀    (4.1) 																							𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0	 + 	𝛾	𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 	𝛾2		𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 	𝛾3	𝑍1 + 𝛾4	𝑍3 + 	𝜖	    (4.2) 																																𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 	𝛿0	 + 	𝛿	𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 	𝛿2	𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 	𝛿3	𝑍1 + 	𝜀   (4.3) 
 
Savings, Credit, and Vulnerability are the endogenous variables, and they appear individually 
on the left-hand side of one of the equations. They are binary dummy variables that take the value 
of 0 or 1, signifying whether respondents have saved money over the past year, have borrowed 
money from any source over the past year, and whether they consider themselves vulnerable to 
shocks, respectively. Vulnerability is contingent upon every respondent’s access to emergency 
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funds, whether its savings or loans. Z represents the exogenous independent variables along with 
the error term 𝜀.	 
In order to solve for one of the left hand side variables, such as Savings, all three equations 
must be accounted for simultaneously. Otherwise, estimates would be inconsistent since Credit 
and Vulnerability would be correlated with the movements of the error term.  
To illustrate, Savings is a determinant of Credit although perhaps not blatantly or directly. 
However, Vulnerability is a determinant of those two dependent variables, but it is also a function 
of both. The survey specifically connects vulnerability with respondents’ access to savings or 
credit funds in case of shocks. As a result, simultaneity becomes necessary in finding a solution 
for all equations.  
 
4.2.1 The Exclusion Restriction: 
As with most structural models, I needed to account for the identification of parameters in the 
equations. In the case of this 3SLS, the order condition requires that the number of excluded 
predetermined variables in every equation be greater than or equal to the total number of 
endogenous variables in the system of equations minus 1 – which in this case adds up to two. The 
excluded variables are therefore taken out of the set of variables denoted as Z in the above 
equations.  
Although this simultaneous 3SLS model differs from the traditional IV 2SLS model, the 
intuition behind the exclusion restriction follows the same logic. Without the exclusion, the 
endogenous variables would be perfectly collinear with Z1 and Z2, and the model would collapse. 
The restriction creates “pseudo-IVs” from its excluded variables. Later in the paper, I rely on a 
traditional IV system of equations for robustness checks.  
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Insufficient funds and cost of services function as IVs specific to credit as they influence credit 
directly but not vulnerability. Cost of services is akin to the price of a product which is the main 
determinant of demand. Meanwhile the lack of sufficient funds could positively impact the need 
for credit in the short run. As for savings, the distance from institutions and the amount of trust in 
an institution can determine if an individual decides to save his/her money at that institution. 
Therefore, vulnerability does not include the institutional variables, since they impact it through 
the other endogenous variables, savings and credit. 
 
4.2.2 Zellner Estimation: 
The 3SLS Simultaneous-Equation model generates more efficient and consistent estimates 
than a series of independent single-equations as a result of the Zellner method. Single-equations 
from the same set of observations will display error terms that are correlated, yielding inefficient 
parameters.  
Through this model, generalized least squares estimates are obtained. 3SLS begins by 
producing fitted values for the endogenous variables generated by a 2SLS model, and then it 
improves upon them in the third stage by taking into account any cross-equation correlation. 
 
4.3 The Variables: 
The predetermined exogenous variables in this model can be split into two groups, Z1 and Z2. 
Z1 is the set of characteristics of the individuals taking part in the survey. It includes gender, since 
this paper mentions earlier that a gender gap exists in developing countries. It also factors in 
income, since the top income quintile in developing economies has double the ease in financial 
penetration (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012). This does not necessitate usage, and it will be 
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interesting in determining the difference. Additionally, the sample statistics show that more 
individuals save and take out loans from formal institutions if they belong to a higher income 
quintile.  
In Africa, individuals in the age group between 25 and 64 exhibit the largest account 
penetration, as do individuals with higher education (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, 2012). These 
determinants of account penetration will be accounted for in my model for financial usage, and it 
will be wise to note whether their effect on usage is symmetric. 
Z2 involves variables related to the individuals’ perception of the state of institutions. Having 
a financial account is factored in yet its impact on demand for formal credit is dubious. On an 
institutional level, the distance from financial institutions and the cost of services are also included 
in the model. These variables are self-reported, and that controls for differences across individuals 
which would have been overlooked otherwise had a more systematic variable been used. 
Savings and Credit share a simultaneous impact, yet the impact’s sign could go in either 
direction. An increased level of savings or funds could reduce the risk of defaulting on loans and 
improve demand for credit. At the same time, more savings could simply mean less need for loans. 
A study has shown that both savings and loans in Kenya are mostly used for non-farming or 
business purposes. (Beck et al. 2007b) Thus, the availability of one could replace the other. 
Finally, vulnerability plays a key role with both savings and credit. Most poor households use 
loans in order to smooth consumption. (Beck, World Bank, 2008) Additionally, another study in 
Kenya finds that households rely on savings to reduce the harmful impact of illnesses or other 
emergencies. (Beck et al. 2008) 
Since the project with the RCCs is built on the principle of reducing vulnerability through a 
new form of credit, it is critical to determine traditional credit’s effect on vulnerability and vice 
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versa. This could help forecast the impact this project has. Additionally, determining the factors 
influencing people’s usage of financial services could help forecast the demand for this product, 
and could help us figure out who to tailor RCCs to. 
 
4.4 Analysis 
The 3SLS model is run using three different credit variables: the first variable factors in all 
types of credit – be it formal or informal, the second model only uses loans from formal institutions 
as a variable for credit, and the third variable refers to loans from informal institutions.  
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Table 4.2: The 3SLS Model for All Credit, Savings, and Vulnerability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Credit Formal Loan Informal Loan 
Savings* 0.246 -0.112 0.379 
 (0.41) (-0.19) (0.46) 
    
Vulnerable* 2.561 0.992 2.596 
 (0.91) (0.35) (0.70) 
    
Bills 0.367 0.168 0.326 
 (0.91) (0.42) (0.60) 
    
Insufficient Funds -0.141 -0.138 -0.139 
 (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.44) 
    
Expensive Services -0.195 -0.107 -0.204 
 (-0.69) (-0.37) (-0.55) 
    
Institutions Far 0.105 0.0378 0.124 
 (0.76) (0.27) (0.69) 
    
Trust In Institutions -0.152 -0.0733 -0.137 
 (-0.49) (-0.23) (-0.34) 
    
Documents 0.0144 -0.00825 0.0164 
 (0.19) (-0.10) (0.17) 
    
Farmer 0.229 0.0756 0.216 
 (1.00) (0.33) (0.70) 
    
Financial Account 0.402 0.260 0.352 
 (0.81) (0.52) (0.53) 
    
Female -0.0852 -0.0368 -0.0846 
 (-0.75) (-0.33) (-0.55) 
    
Education 0.103 0.0411 0.117 
 (0.74) (0.30) (0.63) 
    
Age 0.0000970 0.00385* -0.00219 
 (0.05) (2.34) (-0.77) 
    
Income Quintiles 0.0901 0.0316 0.0866 
 (1.07) (0.38) (0.77) 
    
_cons -1.171 -0.613 -1.314 
 (-0.88) (-0.46) (-0.74) 
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Table 4.2 (Continued)    
 Savings Savings Savings 
Vulnerable* -0.537*** 0.407 -0.684*** 
 (-5.73) (0.79) (-5.66) 
    
Credit* 0.752***   
 (3.95)   
    
Bills -0.00332 0.126** -0.00347 
 (-0.21) (2.68) (-0.24) 
    
Farmer 0.000138 0.133** -0.0153 
 (0.00) (3.12) (-0.34) 
    
Institutions Far 0.00000959 0.0345 -0.00115 
 (0.00) (0.74) (-0.14) 
    
Income Quintile -0.0334** -0.00128 -0.0329* 
 (-2.80) (-0.06) (-2.25) 
    
Trust In Institutions -0.00630 0.0565 -0.00572 
 (-0.30) (0.60) (-0.29) 
    
Documents -0.00407 0.0667 -0.00372 
 (-0.27) (1.25) (-0.28) 
    
Account 0.149** 0.232*** 0.125* 
 (3.10) (3.36) (2.07) 
    
Education 0.00338 0.0504 -0.0166 
 (0.13) (1.23) (-0.51) 
    
Female 0.00302 -0.0246 0.00927 
 (0.11) (-0.65) (0.29) 
    
Age -0.000439 -0.00529 0.00151 
 (-0.40) (-1.25) (1.04) 
    
Formal Loan*  1.320  
  (1.36)  
    
Informal Loan*   0.799*** 
   (3.62) 
    
_cons 0.403** 0.189 0.516** 
 (2.68) (0.80) (3.21) 
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 Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 
Credit* 1.314***   
 (3.45)   
    
Savings* -1.838*** -0.372 -1.470*** 
 (-5.38) (-0.65) (-5.53) 
    
Government Support 0.00862 0.0989 0.00556 
 (0.33) (1.40) (0.28) 
    
Farmer 0.00728 -0.00798 -0.0165 
 (0.11) (-0.11) (-0.25) 
    
Income Quintile -0.0612** -0.0327 -0.0481** 
 (-3.29) (-1.74) (-2.74) 
    
Insufficient Funds 0.00983 0.0962 0.00550 
 (0.33) (0.89) (0.29) 
    
Account 0.287* 0.155 0.194 
 (2.44) (1.11) (1.64) 
    
Education 0.00598 -0.0336 -0.0230 
 (0.13) (-0.72) (-0.51) 
    
Female 0.00540 0.0161 0.0130 
 (0.12) (0.36) (0.29) 
    
Age -0.000766 0.00367 0.00212 
 (-0.40) (0.73) (1.06) 
    
Formal Loan*  -0.994  
  (-0.89)  
    
Informal Loan*   1.125*** 
   (3.66) 
    
_cons 0.767*** 0.695* 0.766*** 
 (3.73) (2.13) (3.82) 
N 968 968 968 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table	4.2	(Continued) 
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With the pooled credit variable, no independent variable stands out as a significant link with 
the dependent variable. Savings appears to be positively correlated with Credit, albeit 
insignificantly, a result that appears to be generally reciprocated across equations. People who save 
more tend to take out more credit in all its forms. The variable that’s closest to significance in the 
case of Credit is the income level with a p-value of 0.285. The income group people belong to 
does influence usage of credit positively. Additionally, vulnerability exhibited the largest estimate, 
implying that as vulnerability increases, credit usage increases by a lot. 
The Savings equation tells a better story. If people perceived themselves as vulnerable, that 
reduced their savings significantly. These numbers are corroborated for when the different types 
of loans are accounted for. Meanwhile Credit and Savings again exhibit that they are positively 
linked, and credit’s effect is quite significant. The direction flows from credit to savings, but not 
the other way around. Meanwhile, having an account encouraged savings, yet its impact on credit 
usage was insignificant. Finally, as income quintile rose, less savings occurred.  
Credit and savings both significantly influenced vulnerability. The more people saved, the less 
vulnerable they considered themselves, while credit had the opposite effect, surprisingly. Loan 
usage pushed people to consider themselves as more vulnerable. Meanwhile, a person’s wealth 
had the opposite effect. With saving’s negative impact on vulnerability, my results fit the literature 
which states that savings are more targeted towards non-farming practices – in this case, 
emergencies. The results hold up across all three models.  
Financial penetration, in this case referred to as “Account”, does not tell a consistent story. It 
appears that having an account at an institution positively influences one’s perception of their own 
vulnerability. It also has an insignificant impact on the usage of credit. Even in the case with formal 
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loans, it does not significantly impact people’s reliance on loans from formal institutions. It 
appears that financial penetration does not imply usage of credit or therefore easier risk smoothing. 
Having an account does not improve the demand for loans from those institutions. The hassle 
of the paperwork does not hinder those demand significantly either. It appears that financial 
penetration and the ease of access are not significant determinants of demand with our sample. 
Additionally, it is not people’s perception of the services that influences their demand.  
As for savings, formal loans also have a positive impact, as do informal loans. In fact, relying 
on informal loans appears to be the biggest driver of savings. Relative to formal loans, farmers 
tend to significantly save more. 
Informal loans appear to increase people’s belief that they are vulnerable, while taking out 
formal loans has no noticeable impact. Loans, from informal institutions, makes participants 
consider themselves more prone to shocks. The results are surprising as loans are an encouraged 
instrument for risk smoothing in the general literature.  
In general, formal institutions play a significant role in this model only when it comes to 
savings. Access to those institutions and their characteristics did not encourage credit use. Their 
services, in this case credit use, did not encourage savings. These services and the level of 
penetration did not affect people’s vulnerabilities.  
The key players with people’s vulnerability were savings, informal credit, and income level. 
RCCs target people’s level of vulnerability, yet it is a form of formal credit. The literature does 
identify collateral requirements as a form hindrance towards credit, and that variable was not 
included in this survey. Therefore, formal credit (and RCCs) could still play a major role. 
It is also worth noting that the gender gap does not play a significant role in people’s usage of 
credit or savings. There is also no significant gap in vulnerability. Similarly, education does not 
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influence the endogenous variables in a crucial way. It does point towards improved usage of 
savings and credit, and a decrease in vulnerability, yet never significantly. 
In this next section of the analysis, I divide the sample into farmers and non-farmers, and I run 
the same model as earlier in order to compare the estimates between samples. 
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Table 4.3 Farmers vs Non-Farmers 3SLS Model 
 Non-Farmer Farmer Non-Farmer Farmer Non-Farmer Farmer 
 Credit Credit Loan Informal Loan Informal Loan Formal Loan Formal 
Savings* 0.491 0.549 0.471 0.419 0.0643 0.374 
 (0.84) (0.64) (1.34) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) 
       
Vulnerable* 2.872 1.193 1.899 1.965 2.384 -0.514 
 (0.91) (0.32) (1.10) (0.05) (0.61) (-0.02) 
       
Bills 0.526 0.0889 0.342 0.0127 0.405 -0.0270 
 (0.89) (0.25) (1.04) (0.00) (0.55) (-0.01) 
       
Insufficient 
Funds -0.0764 -0.0590 0.0346 -0.0473 -0.184 -0.0420 
 (-0.34) (-0.14) (0.28) (-0.01) (-0.66) (-0.02) 
       
Expensive 
Services -0.178 -0.0628 -0.0768 0.0766 -0.147 -0.108 
 (-0.47) (-0.22) (-0.37) (0.03) (-0.32) (-0.06) 
       
Institutions 
Far -0.0433 0.0669 -0.0656 0.315 0.0359 0.0834 
 (-0.38) (0.16) (-0.88) (0.08) (0.27) (0.03) 
       
Trust 
Institutions -0.147 -0.00430 -0.0726 0.458 -0.0354 -0.551 
 (-0.38) (-0.01) (-0.34) (0.11) (-0.07) (-0.20) 
       
Documents 0.164 -0.0624 0.132 0.212 0.0724 -0.0978 
 (1.30) (-0.29) (1.75) (0.10) (0.55) (-0.07) 
       
Account  0.275 0.191 0.244 0.545 0.289 -0.0188 
 (0.76) (0.20) (1.19) (0.06) (0.63) (-0.00) 
       
Female -0.167 -0.0106 -0.124 0.00585 -0.151 0.0240 
 (-0.74) (-0.22) (-0.99) (0.02) (-0.55) (0.09) 
       
Education 0.0588 0.0510 0.0369 0.130 0.0367 -0.0131 
 (0.54) (0.21) (0.58) (0.05) (0.29) (-0.01) 
       
Age 0.00339 -0.0008 -0.000163 -0.00223 0.00568 0.00385 
 (0.71) (-0.24) (-0.06) (-0.07) (1.02) (0.18)  
 
Income 
Quintile 
0.191 0.0209 0.137 0.0204 0.143 0.00306 
 (1.00) (0.86) (1.30) (0.10) (0.61) (0.02) 
       
_cons -1.818 -0.303 -1.218 -1.426 -1.840 0.456 
 (-0.97) (-0.24) (-1.19) (-0.12) (-0.80) (0.06) 
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Table	4.3	(Continued)	
Savings Non-Farmer Farmer Non-Farmer Farmer Non-Farmer Farmer 
Vulnerable* -0.749*** -0.588*** -0.844*** -0.580 -0.224 -1.958 
 (-3.34) (-7.35) (-3.71) (-1.63) (-0.63) (-1.21) 
       
Credit* 0.499* 1.091**     
 (2.45) (2.71)     
       
Bills 0.0344 -0.0121 0.0265 0.0171 0.189** 0.00590 
 (0.66) (-0.72) (0.51) (0.36) (2.75) (0.20) 
       
Institutions 
Far -0.000415 0.0079 0.00150 -0.00172 -0.0425 -0.0496 
 (-0.01) (0.52) (0.04) (-0.10) (-0.60) (-0.25) 
       
Income 
Quintile -0.0669
** -0.0207 -0.0755** -0.00653 -0.0299 -0.00251 
 (-2.94) (-1.32) (-3.15) (-0.39) (-1.05) (-0.07) 
       
Trust 
Institutions -0.00325 -0.0762 0.00329 -0.0118 -0.0222 0.0968 
 (-0.07) (-0.85) (0.08) (-0.27) (-0.26) (0.26) 
       
Documents 0.0105 0.0126 0.0127 -0.0212 0.114 0.0396 
 (0.25) (0.65) (0.32) (-0.35) (1.92) (0.25) 
       
Account 0.178** 0.0682 0.165** 0.147 0.242*** 0.476* 
 (3.05) (0.69) (2.59) (0.97) (3.88) (2.25) 
       
Education 0.00299 -0.00230 0.000428 -0.0274 0.0307 -0.0266 
 (0.08) (-0.06) (0.01) (-0.48) (0.76) (-0.28) 
       
Female 0.000564 0.0074 0.0122 0.0101 -0.0313 0.102 
 (0.01) (0.18) (0.27) (0.24) (-0.70) (0.82) 
       
Age -0.00215 0.0003 -0.000904 0.00168 -0.00355 0.0160 
 (-1.23) (0.21) (-0.46) (0.75) (-1.60) (0.86) 
       
Loan 
Informal*   0.526
* 0.621   
   (2.35) (1.09)   
       
Loan 
Formal*     0.590 -3.083 
     (1.31) (-0.90) 
       
_cons 0.804*** 0.204 0.884*** 0.501* 0.666* 0.987** 
 (3.36) (0.74) (3.68) (2.04) (2.38) (3.24) 
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Table	4.3	(Continued)	
	
       
Vulnerable Non-Farmer Farmer Non-Farmer Farmer Non-Farmer Farmer 
Credit* 0.586* 1.199     
 (2.18) (1.65)     
       
Savings* -1.104*** -1.752*** -1.053*** -1.433*** -0.492 -0.635* 
 (-4.24) (-6.86) (-4.30) (-4.92) (-1.70) (-2.03) 
       
Government 
Support 0.00262 0.0326 -0.0000980 -0.0212 0.157 0.0220 
 (0.05) (0.82) (-0.00) (-0.26) (1.06) (0.24) 
       
Income 
Quintile -0.0846
*** -0.0282 -0.0869*** -0.00822 -0.0695*** -0.00294 
 (-4.17) (-1.06) (-4.18) (-0.38) (-3.55) (-0.13) 
       
Insufficient 
Funds 0.0207 0.0742 0.00976 0.0206 0.0598 0.0188 
 (0.48) (0.86) (0.23) (0.62) (0.69) (0.25) 
       
Account 0.184* 0.272 0.160 0.167 0.134 0.276* 
 (2.02) (1.15) (1.76) (0.95) (1.52) (2.13) 
       
Education -0.00248 -0.0062 -0.00370 -0.0544 -0.0221 -0.0149 
 (-0.05) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.97) (-0.46) (-0.25) 
       
Female 0.0111 0.0172 0.0207 0.0150 0.0101 0.0485 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.41) (0.27) (0.20) (0.84) 
       
Age -0.00254 0.0008 -0.000963 0.00303 0.000146 0.00693 
 (-1.18) (0.30) (-0.43) (1.30) (0.03) (1.92) 
       
Loan 
Informal*   0.597
* 1.086**   
   (2.16) (2.70)   
       
Loan 
Formal*     -0.612 -1.338
* 
     (-0.58) (-2.25) 
       
_cons 1.000*** 0.644 1.005*** 0.659 0.974*** 0.639* 
 (6.37) (1.28) (6.35) (1.87) (4.90) (2.39) 
N 465 503 465 503 465 503 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	
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Since the RCC project seeks to target farmers, it is best to compare the estimates generated by 
a sample of farmers only and non-farmers only. Non-farmers are individuals who receive wages 
through non-farming employment.  
Both farmers and non-farmers do not indicate any strong variable encouraging demand for 
credit. Saving displays a positive relationship with any form of credit, as does vulnerability, yet 
their effect is insignificant. It remains unclear what drives or hinders the demand of any form of 
credit across samples. Perception of credit seems to be homogenous regardless of whether one’s a 
farmer or not. 
If a non-farmer considers himself more vulnerable to shocks, they are less able or likely to 
save. This effect is more pronounced with non-farmers than farmers. On the other hand, credit 
appears to positively influence savings, yet the effect is isolated to loans from informal sources. 
Income quintiles is significant player with non-farmers. It discourages savings while 
improving people’s confidence in facing shocks. It does not share this effect with farmers, where 
it appears that income level is not a helpful tool in determining one’s usage of savings or level of 
vulnerability.  
In the earlier section, I identified that financial penetration only influenced savings in our 
sample. This positive effect is isolated to non-farmers only; another non-farmer exclusive trait in 
addition to income quintiles. 
Savings is accompanied with a reduction in vulnerability with both farmers and non-farmers. 
Meanwhile, as pointed out earlier, credit appears to be correlated with a higher level of 
vulnerability. That is isolated to informal loans with both samples. Farmers and non-farmers who 
have taken out informal loans tend to report a higher level of vulnerability. However, farmers 
identified a reduced level of vulnerability when taking out loans from financial institutions. This 
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is a sign of hope for the project seeks to accomplish just that. Meanwhile, institutional and 
individual characteristics continue to play an insignificant role in this model 
In general, the positive influence financial penetration had on savings with the entire sample 
is limited to non-farmers. Additionally, the negative relationship between income quintile and 
savings, and income level and vulnerability observed with the entire sample is also limited to non-
farmers. The positive relationship between credit and savings, and credit and vulnerability, exists 
with both samples of farmers and non-farmers, but is isolated to the informal sector. Formal loans 
and informal loans held opposite effects on vulnerability with farmers only. 
 
4.5 Robustness Checks: 
I conducted a robustness check using a three-stage IV-logit model, controlling for the 
endogeneity of Credit and Savings in the first two stages and fitting their predicted linear values 
into the final stage that has vulnerability, a binary variable, as the dependent variable. The results 
corroborated the increased level of vulnerability experienced by the usage of informal loans and 
lent further hope to formal loans acting as a method to smooth vulnerability. 
The logit model aids in maintaining linearity between the binary dependent variable, 
vulnerability, and the categorical independent variables, such as income quintile which can take 
on a discrete value from 1 to 5. The logit estimates aid in predicting the odds of an event affecting 
the dependent variable, or the changes in probability. 
 
The final stage of the logit model is: 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽	𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽	𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 	𝛽	𝑊 + 	𝜀	 (4.5.1) 
where W represents the same predetermined variables as earlier. 
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The first two stages look as follows: 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 	𝛼 + 	𝛾	𝑍1 + 	𝛾	𝑊 + 	𝜀		  (4.5.2) 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 	𝛼 + 	𝛿	𝑍2 + 	𝛾	𝑊 + 	𝜀  (4.5.3) 
The fitted values of savings and credit are then replaced in vulnerability’s logit equation. Z1 
represents the same instruments used in the earlier model with an instrument added specifically 
for savings, the use of a debit card. Similarly, Z2 includes the same instruments in the earlier model 
with another instrument included specifically for credit, the usage of a credit card. These 
instrument have been demonstrated to be valid as they influence their respective endogenous 
variables without having a direct link to vulnerability. 
 The following are separate one-stage single equation logits for the three variables: 
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Table 4.4: Single-Equation Logit Model for Credit as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Credit Loan Formal Loan Informal 
Savings* 1.494*** 1.207* 1.116*** 
 (7.52) (2.44) (6.19) 
    
Vulnerable* 0.196 0.118 0.130 
 (1.03) (0.48) (0.82) 
    
Account  0.810** 1.529* 0.394 
 (2.92) (2.53) (1.63) 
    
Institutions Far -0.392 0.0625 -0.464 
 (-1.37) (0.08) (-1.85) 
    
Expensive Services 0.282 -0.528 0.469 
 (0.96) (-0.59) (1.81) 
    
Documents 0.386 -1.124 0.0919 
 (1.40) (-1.07) (0.39) 
    
Insufficient Funds 0.786** -0.903 0.589* 
 (2.90) (-1.55) (2.47) 
    
Age 0.00266 0.0419*** -0.0119 
 (0.35) (4.68) (-1.94) 
    
Education 0.0109 0.00693 0.115 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.82) 
    
Income Quintile 0.121 0.0209 0.0341 
 (1.73) (0.23) (0.58) 
    
Female -0.0216 0.0396 -0.0345 
 (-0.12) (0.18) (-0.23) 
    
Farmer 0.772*** 0.000439 0.571*** 
 (4.06) (0.00) (3.70) 
    
_cons -1.295* -5.637*** -0.756 
 (-2.49) (-6.31) (-1.71) 
N 968 968 968 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4.5: Single-Equation Logit Model for Savings as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Savings Savings Savings 
Credit* 1.493***   
 (7.45)   
    
Vulnerable* -0.599** -0.561** -0.573** 
 (-3.21) (-3.13) (-3.13) 
    
Account 1.295*** 1.457*** 1.427*** 
 (4.75) (5.54) (5.35) 
    
Institutions Far 0.121 -0.00294 0.138 
 (0.46) (-0.01) (0.53) 
    
Trust Institutions 0.174 0.383 0.270 
 (0.53) (1.22) (0.84) 
    
Expensive Services -0.122 0.0166 -0.133 
 (-0.46) (0.07) (-0.51) 
    
Documents -0.0292 0.132 0.0729 
 (-0.11) (0.54) (0.29) 
    
Insufficient Funds -0.00410 0.284 0.0665 
 (-0.02) (1.13) (0.26) 
    
age -0.00161 -0.00374 0.000992 
 (-0.22) (-0.52) (0.14) 
    
Education 0.266 0.286 0.252 
 (1.51) (1.69) (1.46) 
    
Income Quintile -0.0360 -0.0197 -0.0185 
 (-0.50) (-0.28) (-0.26) 
    
Female -0.157 -0.149 -0.133 
 (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.75) 
    
Farmer 0.780*** 1.013*** 0.829*** 
 (4.09) (5.49) (4.41) 
    
Loan Formal*  1.284**  
  (2.66)  
    
Loan Informal*   1.084*** 
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   (5.96) 
    
_cons -0.849 -0.397 -0.775 
 (-1.41) (-0.69) (-1.30) 
N 968 968 968 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4.6: Single-Equation Logit Model for Vulnerability as Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 
Credit* 0.208   
 (1.08)   
    
Savings* -0.580** -0.527** -0.556** 
 (-3.13) (-2.96) (-3.06) 
    
Government Support 0.245 0.254 0.246 
 (1.03) (1.06) (1.03) 
    
Female 0.0897 0.0884 0.0896 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) 
    
Age -0.00117 -0.00146 -0.000883 
 (-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.15) 
    
Education -0.219 -0.218 -0.221 
 (-1.61) (-1.60) (-1.63) 
    
Income Quintile -0.178** -0.176** -0.176** 
 (-3.22) (-3.18) (-3.19) 
    
Account -0.594** -0.576** -0.579** 
 (-2.75) (-2.67) (-2.69) 
    
Insufficient Funds 0.461* 0.491* 0.471* 
 (2.20) (2.35) (2.25) 
    
Farmer -0.198 -0.177 -0.193 
 (-1.34) (-1.20) (-1.30) 
    
Loan Formal*  0.0623  
  (0.26)  
    
Loan Informal*   0.135 
   (0.85) 
    
_cons 1.106** 1.191** 1.135** 
 (2.74) (2.99) (2.83) 
N 968 968 968 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00 
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First round single-equation logits describe the odds connecting the variables. Although the 
estimates are biased and inconsistent, they do give some insight. Savings in this appears to improve 
the odds of taking out loans, whether it’s formal or informal. According to these results, one-unit 
increase in savings predicts around 1.5 increase in the log of odds of taking out loans. I know from 
the earlier analysis that these variables are inconsistent, yet even in this case with the inflated 
estimates, savings’ effect on formal loans continues to have minimal significance. This goes to 
show the weak drivers behind the demand for formal loans. 
If age increases by one unit, the log likelihood of taking out formal loans rises by 0.04, a small 
yet significant number. This find matches the earlier 3SLS model. Additionally, if insufficient 
funds worsen, they improve the likelihood of taking out an informal loan.  
If one becomes a farmer, that increases the log likelihood of taking out loans from informal 
sources by a significant 0.571. Farmers’ attitudes towards loans remains ambiguous when 
factoring in all models. In addition, having a financial account increases the odds of taking formal 
loans by 1.53. The number isn’t heavily significant, and it continues to prove that financial 
penetration encourages savings more than credit in Kenya. In fact, having an account increases the 
odds of saving by more than 1 at an unanimously significant level of p<0. Credit displays the same 
effect on savings, with the credit weighted more heavily towards informal loans than formal loans. 
Vulnerability continues to display a negative relationship on savings. If one begins to consider 
himself vulnerable, the odds of them savings drops by more than half. On the other hand, if one 
identifies as a farmer, the odds of them saving increases by an estimate between 0.8 and 1. This 
matches an earlier result.  
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As for vulnerability, credit’s effect is insignificant yet it is worth noting that it is positive. After 
correcting for endogeneity in the next section, informal credit’s positive effect on the odds of 
considering oneself vulnerable becomes more clear. 
If one saves, the odds they consider themselves vulnerable drops by half. Moving up income 
quintiles has similar effects. Insufficient funds display a significant impact on the odds of being 
vulnerable, yet these results are questionable when factoring in this paper’s entire analysis. Having 
a financial account reduces the odds of vulnerability by half. 
 
The previous variables are endogenous as a result of reverse causality. They are corrected for 
in a three stage system using the previously mentioned IVs. The following are the results of the 
key dependent variable, vulnerability:  
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Table 4.7: Logit for Vulnerability after Controlling for Endogeneity 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 
Credit* 0.570*   
 (2.02)   
    
Savings* -0.845*** -0.458*** -0.729*** 
 (-4.10) (-3.82) (-4.55) 
    
Government Support 0.270 0.469 0.231 
 (1.03) (1.87) (0.86) 
    
Farmer -0.0167 0.153 -0.0395 
 (-0.08) (0.86) (-0.20) 
    
Income Quintile -0.229*** -0.165** -0.187*** 
 (-3.67) (-2.97) (-3.34) 
    
Insufficient Funds 0.241 0.337 0.198 
 (0.90) (1.21) (0.70) 
    
Account 0.547* 1.053** 0.339 
 (2.08) (2.79) (1.14) 
    
Education -0.0242 -0.111 -0.103 
 (-0.16) (-0.78) (-0.72) 
    
Female -0.00452 0.0490 0.0121 
 (-0.03) (0.34) (0.09) 
    
Age -0.00213 0.00687 0.00631 
 (-0.37) (0.80) (0.88) 
    
Formal Loans*  -0.180  
  (-1.43)  
    
Informal Loans*   0.683* 
   (2.05) 
    
_cons 0.393 -0.781 0.471 
 (0.97) (-0.88) (1.15) 
N 968 968 968 
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The corrected results confirm the robustness of the initial results from the 3SLS simultaneity 
model. With one-unit increases in savings, the log of odds of considering oneself vulnerable to 
shocks drops approximately by 0.8. Meanwhile, informal credit continues to appear to be a source 
of distress. If an individual takes out loans from informal sources, the log-odds of reporting 
vulnerability rises by 0.68. Informal credit is the main driver of the positive effect all credit has on 
vulnerability. In fact, loans from formal sources reduce the odds of vulnerability, but that effect is 
insignificant. 
If an individual moves up by one unit to a higher income quintile, the odds of them reporting 
vulnerability drops by around 0.2 at a significance level of p < 0. This result has been verified 
through all models and was isolated earlier to non-farmers. On the other hand, having a financial 
account in this case increases the odds of being vulnerable. Financial penetration’s effect on 
vulnerability is hard to pigeonhole. For example, it loses significance when informal loans replace 
formal loans, while the rest of the estimates hold up. The only sturdy result is its positive influence 
on savings. 
 
4.6 Asymmetric Correlation and External Credit Rationing 
Across all models, vulnerability displayed no impact on credit, while credit repeatedly resulted 
in a positive estimate on vulnerability. There was an asymmetry between estimates in terms of 
signs and, more importantly, in significance. On the other hand, savings and vulnerability showed 
a symmetric correlation across stages. 
The asymmetry can help explain the cause of the repressed usage of formal loans. With 
farmers, formal loans displayed a negative effect on vulnerability, which is asymmetric to the 
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effect of informal loans. Meanwhile, there exists no relationship from vulnerability on either types 
of loans.  
I can therefore speculate on causality and point at a substitution effect between formal and 
informal loans. In other words, the reason vulnerable farmers borrow more informally could be 
the result of external credit rationing.  
External credit rationing is imposed by the lender. The concept occurs when institutions are 
not willing to lend credit to the borrower when the borrower does not possess enough collateral to 
reduce the risk. Another cause of external credit rationing is the regulatory environment of the 
lending institutions (Barry et al, 1995: 194-199).  
What this tells us about the regulatory environment is that financial institutions are able to 
assess the creditworthiness of an individual in a better way than relatives and friends can. 
Borrowers who are turned down by institutions resort to lending from family members who are 
not able to form objective decisions about a person’s creditworthiness. Formal lenders assess 
investments objectively, while family members can be biased towards supporting any investment 
by a family member. However, since this asymmetry is limited to farmers, it may appear that 
formal lenders deem agricultural investments more risk. 
As I had mentioned earlier in this paper, financial institutions are short on lending in Kenya, 
resulting in the aforementioned external credit rationing. The low usage of formal credit is not the 
result of low demand but of reluctant supply, and RCCs can reduce people’s riskiness and resolve 
this issue. 
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
For my model, I ran a three stage simultaneous equation model to control for the endogeneity 
of savings, credit, and vulnerability. These variables displayed a simultaneity bias amongst 
themselves. 
The major finding is credit’s positive impact on an individual’s vulnerability. The positive sign 
is isolated to loans from informal sources, while formal loans reduces one’s vulnerability – 
especially with farmers. This indicates a restrictive formal sector that assesses lenders’ investments 
more aptly than informal sources do.  
No variable significantly impacts credit, while credit improves savings. Meanwhile, savings 
reduces one’s vulnerability across all samples. Having a financial account did not maintain 
robustness across models. In other words, having an account at a financial institution does not 
guarantee the usage of services such as loans. Having an account did however increase savings, 
but with non-farmers only. 
In addition to the three key variables, an individual’s income also showed significant results. 
Wealth reduced individuals’ vulnerability. These results maintained robustness with the three-
stage logit model. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Recommendations for the SATISFy Project 
The “SATISFy” project seeks to aid the vulnerable by introducing them to Risk-Contingent 
Credit. This paper finds that a significant factor in determining the vulnerable population of Kenya 
is wealth; jumping income quintiles reduces vulnerability. However, this result is limited to non-
farmers. Since RCCs are targeted to vulnerable farmers, this population’s wealth should not be 
significantly relevant.  
What does influence the composition of the vulnerable population are savings and informal 
loans. Savings relieves vulnerability, while taking out loans from informal sources increases it. 
The latter is an indicator that there is room for the formal financial sector since the informal sector 
is a source of anxiety. In the promotion of RCCs, this result could be capitalized on. 
That being said, vulnerability does not play a significant role in the usage formal credit. This 
is significant since RCC is in itself a form of formal credit. In fact, no measured variable does have 
an impact. The literature on credit and insurance points heavily at collateral requirements’ role in 
this regard, and this leaves room for that possibility.  
A spillover effect of rendering credit accessible through RCCs is its positive impact on savings. 
Savings in turn eases vulnerability. The reason savings’ positive effect on credit is minimal could 
be the result of the small size of the lending sector in Kenya. RCCs theoretically broaden that 
sector, therefore strengthening savings’ impact on borrowing. The project should analyze the role 
the presence of savings has on the take-up of RCCs, as well as the change in savings occurring 
with the purchase of this instrument.  
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Financial penetration’s impact is almost exclusive to savings. People with accounts at 
institutions tend to save more. Having a financial account does not indicate an increased level of 
borrowing from these institutions. The usage of credit services is dry. Yet the usage of informal 
loans is high, indicating a significant demand for borrowing. The asymmetry between formal loans 
and vulnerability, and informal loans and vulnerability, points to external credit rationing. Demand 
for credit exists, yet the low usage is institutional. Therefore, uptake of RCCs looks to be high.   
 
5.2 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I showed that Kenyan lenders are reluctant to enter the agriculture sector. Most 
Kenyan farmers rely on informal lending for their investments. However, I find in this paper than 
informal lending is a source of stress for farmers, who have a more positive outlook towards formal 
lending. This indicates a mismatch between demand and supply for loans from formal sources, 
and its cause is institutional due to external credit rationing. Institutions are not willing to lend 
borrowers while family members are. What this tells us is that institutions run a much more 
objective assessment of borrowers’ investments than relatives do. 
Additionally, policies encouraging financial inclusion in developing economies have focused 
their efforts on encouraging individuals to reach out to banks and open accounts. Yet my results 
indicate that having an account does not necessitate the usage of services such as credit, which 
reduces vulnerability. However, having an account can improve savings, which in turn can reduce 
vulnerability, although these results were limited to non-farmers. As a next step, I recommend an 
analysis of panel data for individuals as they face shocks and as they manage their finances. 
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